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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COURT-IMPOSED BIRTH
CONTROL AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION*
Jack P. Lipton" and Colin F. Campbell'
The impetus for this article was provided by a recent criminal
matter in Maricopa County Superior Court in Arizona involving
Debra Ann Forster.t The case received considerable local and
national attention in the media and raises profound constitutional
and ethical issues that could be of direct concern to both legal
scholars and practicing attorneys. While this article focuses primarily
on the Forster case, our discussion and analysis have more general
implications.
The basic facts of the Forster case are as follows. On the basis
of a plea agreement, Forster, who was a minor at the time the
crimes were committed, was convicted of two charges of attempted
child abuse.' The plea agreement was executed by Forster and
accepted by the Maricopa County Superior Court on April 4, 1988.?
On May 24, 1988, Debra Forster was placed on probation.
* The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of David Cohen of Arnold & Porter,
Garrett Simpson of the Maricopa County Public Defender, and Professor Robert Glennon
of the University of Arizona College of Law. This paper was not done under the auspices
of Arizona State University. ASU assumes no responsibility for the content. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the authors.
** Adjunct Assistant Professor of Psychology, Arizona State University and Law Clerk to
Hon. Thomas Tang, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. B.A., 1973, U.C.L.A.;
M.A., 1975, California State University; Ph.D., 1979, University of California; J.D., 1988,
University of Arizona.
*** Partner at Meyer, Hendricks, Victor, Osborn & Maledon, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona.
B.A., 1974, Northwestern University; J.D., 1977 University of Arizona.
1. State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup. Ct., Sept. 2, 1988).
2. Sentencing Memorandum, at 1-2, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co.,
Ariz., Sup. Ct., June 7, 1988). The basic facts of the crime follows. Debra Forster had two
children, William, who was one and one-half years old, and Scott, who was six months old.
In July 1987, Ms. Forster left the two children alone in an apartment in Mesa, Arizona for
two days; during her absence, no one cared for the children. Id. at 68. Ms. Forster's then
estranged husband discovered the children. They were suffering from dehydration, diaper
rash, and skin lesions. Id. Both children were immediately hospitalized and remained in
serious condition for several days. Id.
3. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Change of Plea, at 19-20, State v. Forster, No.
CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup. Ct., June 7, 1988); Change of Plea, State v. Forster,
No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup. Ct., June 7, 1988).
4. Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, Sentencing, at 13, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-
10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup. Ct., June 7, 1988).
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Despite the fact that Forster is Catholic, Superior Court Judge Ellis-
Budzyn ordered her to use birth control for the rest of her life as
a condition of the probation.' Specifically, Term #20 of the
probation order specified that: "the defendant shall remain on some
method of birth control throughout the term of probation with
written evidence to be furnished periodically to the supervising adult
probation officer."' Although no appellate court has yet considered
the issue, the imposition of birth control as a condition of probation
could be deemed a violation of both the United States and Arizona
Constitutions.'
In this article, we analyze six propositions: First, a court
ordering a person to use birth control represents an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy.' Second, if the defendant is Catholic, as Debra
Forster is, and since the Catholic Church prohibits the use of
artificial birth control, Term #20 violates the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.9  Third, the State has no compelling
interest that could justify the infringement on constitutional privacy
rights and religious freedom of a defendant like Forster. Fourth,
being required to use birth control is "cruel and unusual punishment"
and therefore unconstitutional under the eighth amendment."0 Fifth,
court-ordered birth control constitutes impermissible involuntary
sterilization. Sixth, the specific language of Term #20 in the Forster
case is, unconstitutionally vague. Because the Forster case originated
in Arizona, applicable Arizona law is discussed throughout this
article.
I. CoNSTITUTIONAL RIorr OF PRIVACY
Sexual and reproductive activities are perhaps the most private
5. Id., at 13-14. In Arizona, the statute authorizing lifetime probation, ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-604.1 (1974 & Supp. 1988), was recently declared unconstitutional. State v.
Wagstaff, 12 Ariz. Adv. Rep 14 (Ct. App. July 7, 1988).
6. Probation Order, at 28, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup.
Ct., May 24, 1988).
7. This probation term also violates provisions of the Arizona state constitution. See, e.g.,
ARIz. CONsr., art. II, §§ 8, 15. Indeed, although state constitutions are often overlooked, in
considering such issues, the Arizona Constitution is a fruitful source of analysis and argument.
8. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Of course, this argument would also apply to any religion which
prohibits contraception.
10. U.S. CoNrsT. amend. VII1.
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of all human behavior.1 For a judge to order a person to use
contraceptives is a startling abuse of governmental power. Certainly,
such a grave infringement on a person's privacy rises to a constitu-
tional violation. t2 In the following section, we analyze the existing
jurisprudence relating to the right of privacy. Specifically, we argue
that court-ordered birth control is unconstitutional because of the
intrusions on contraceptive behavior, procreation, parenting, and
interpersonal intimacy.
A. Privacy and the Decision to Use Birth Control
Although there is considerable disagreement regarding the
specific textual support of the federal constitutional right of privacy,"3
the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that such
a right does exist. Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court recently
declared that the "right to privacy emanated from the penumbra of
specific guarantees of particular amendments to the Constitution."4
Among the rights that are protected by the Constitutional right
of privacy are "those which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.""' 5 Certainly, "fundamental is the right to
be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted
governmental intrusions into one's privacy." 6 While the outer limits
of this aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court, it is
clear that, among the decisions that an individual may make without
unjustified governmental interference are personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education.""
11. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
12. Cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479; Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
14. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 212, 741 P.2d. 674, 681 (1987) (right to refuse
medical treatment is sufficiently fundamental to fall within the constitutionally protected zone
of privacy).
15. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (while matters relating to marriage procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education are fundamental in the
guarantee of privacy, the circulation of a flyer with petitioner's picture on it captioned "active
shoplifters" does not violate any fundamental right).
16. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (mere private possession of obscene
matter cannot constitutionally be made a crime).
17. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (citations omitted). Of
course, there are some activities that are outside the protections of the constitutional right
of privacy. For example, the Supreme Court of Arizona has ruled that "the right to wear long
1989]
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In Griswold v. Connecticut,"8 the Supreme Court struck down a
state statute which essentially criminalized the use of birth control. t9
If the government may not constitutionally prohibit the use of
contraception," then it would seem to follow that the government
cannot require the use of birth control. Indeed, "decisions whether
to accomplish or to prevent conception are among the most private
and sensitive,"21 and the decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child is at the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected
choices."'
Furthermore, if the constitutional right to privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy,"'  a decision that arguably involves the
termination of the life of a potential child, then certainly a woman's
decision whether or not to use birth control is similarly protected by
the Constitution.
Court-imposed birth control intrudes on the sanctity of the
marital relationship itself. Indeed, marriage "has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness of free men," 4 and sexual or birth control
decisions within a marriage are as private as one can imagine. From
a psychological perspective, court-imposed birth control not only
constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on a woman's body and
hair is [not] a fundamental right," Pendley v. Mingus Union High School, 109 Ariz. 18, 24,
504 P.2d 919, 925 (1972), and that "[tlhere is no fundamental right to possess marijuana."
State v. Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 60, 570 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1977). And while we may be further
willing to concede that "the 'right' to unobserved masturbation in a public theatre is [neither]
'fundamental' [nior 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc.
v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243, 1248 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton, 413
U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))), the right to
conceive a child is not in this same category. Furthermore, in the recent decision of Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986), the Supreme Court found no fundamental right for
homosexuals to engage in sodomy but still acknowledged "a fundamental individual right to
decide whether or not to beget or bear a child." Id.
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
19. Id. at 485-86. In considering the implications of such a statute, the Court considered
whether "we [would] allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for
telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship." Id.
20. Id. at 479.
21. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
22. Id.
23. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
24. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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on her contraceptive decision-making, but can also intrude on her
marital relationship.' Based on empirical research, psychologists are
in agreement that contraception influences the marital relationship.'
Although the defendant in the Forster case is female, court-
imposed birth control would also intrude on the privacy of male
probationers. 7 Here, the privacy rights of Debra Forster's husband
are not squarely at issue. However, it should be noted that the
probation order would also directly infringe upon the constitutional
privacy rights of Mr. Forster.
B. Privacy and the Fundamental Rights of Procreation and Parenting.
In addition to the severe infringement on a person's contracep-
tive behavior, court-imposed birth control also unconstitutionally
invades privacy rights because of its effects on the rights to
procreate and to be a parent. Certainly the fundamental liberty
interest of prospective parents, including Debra Forster, to care and
provide for their unborn children "does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of the child to the State. Even when blood relationships
are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life."' By complying with the
probation order, defendants like Debra Forster will forever be
denied the opportunity to give birth, be a parent again, and choose
to live their lifes in a family atmosphere.
The state must meet a heavy burden in order to terminate
parental rights.' In Forster, the government sought to terminate the
parental rights of Debra Forster before a child was born, and
certainly well before any parental wrongdoing was proven with
25. See, e.&, E. POHLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BIRTH PLANNING 347-50 (1969).
26. Id.
27. There are, however, important constitutional distinctions between court-ordered birth
control for men versus women. For example, condoms, the most common male form of birth
control, are considerably less intrusive than female methods such as the pill, the IUD, and
the diaphragm. It is not clear, though, whether a man ordered to use birth control would be
in compliance if his woman partner used contraception. Would the man be in compliance
if he erroneously believed that his partner used birth control?
28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (due process clause demands more than
a "fair preponderance of the evidence" to support the termination of parental rights in their
natural child, must be at least clear and convincing).
29. Id. at 748.
1989]
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respect to these yet unborn children.' No state interest can justify
such a constitutional invasion.
C. Intimacy and the Intrusiveness of
Court-Ordered Birth Control
When one considers the realities of birth control, and specifical-
ly the degree of intimacy and physical intrusion involved, the idea
of court-ordered birth control is startling. Every method of birth
control involves very intimate sexual activity and necessitates some
form of bodily intrusion, with the most effective methods of birth
control being the most intrusive. Indeed, for a court to require such
intrusions into privacy, to use the words of Justice Frankfurter,
"shocks the conscience."3
A brief discussion regarding the intrusiveness of various methods
of birth control is in order. Basically, birth control pills prevent the
ovaries from releasing eggs.32 Birth control pills involve serious
privacy intrusions in that the woman ingests synthetic hormones
which "obtain their contracetive effect primarily by altering the
cervical mucus, making it inhospitable to sperm transport, and by
altering the endometrial environment, thus inhibitin the implantation
of the fertilized egg."33  The intrauterine device (IUD) must be
surgically implanted, leading to possible complications at time of
insertion?4 The contraceptive effect of the IUD is thought to occur
as a result of the "foreign body" stimulating "an inflammatory
30. Certainly, if Forster were to bear a child, and if she were deemed incapable or
unwilling to properly care for the child, then several alternatives would be available including
(a) Forster voluntary relinquishing her parental rights and putting the child up for adoption,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-106 - 8-107 (1974 & Supp. 1988); and (b) the state instituting
formal termination proceedings in compliance with the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-531 to -544, § 8-106 (1974
& Supp. 1988). See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971).
31. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). In addition to the unconstitutional
intrusion into privacy caused by the mandated birth control itself, the probation order further
intrudes into Forster's constitutionally protected zone of privacy by requiring the periodical
submission of 'Written evidence" concerning this private activity. Reporter's Transcript of
Proceedings, Sentencing, at 13, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., June
7, 1988).
32. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, BASICS OF BIRTH CONTROL at 2 (1988).
33. C. PORTER, R. WAIFE, & H. HOLTROP, CONmRACEPTION 23 (1983).




reaction somewhat similar to infection."" There are various kinds of
barrier methods,3' such as diaphrams, spermicides, and condoms, and
each entails different types of intrusiveness." There are several
types of "natural" birth control methods. The most comprehensive
method, the "rhythm method," requires very intimate, private activity
involving observations of cervical mucus in conjunction with the
monitoring of the woman's basal body temperature.' Surgical
sterilization is also a form of birth control that would fall under
Term #20. The physical intrusion into a woman's privacy as a result
of this procedure is, of course, severe. 9
D. Relevance of Other Federal Constitutional Provisions
In some sense, the physical intrusion, court-ordered birth control
and its requisite documentation would impose, could be considered
to be an illegal search, violative of the fourth amendment.4 Note
that at least one court has struck down a condition of probation
which would have required the defendant to subject himself to
warrantless searches at any time by the police. 1
Concerning the right of association, however, in Malone v.
United States, 42 the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of certain
conditions of probation for a defendant convicted of unlawful
exportation of firearms to aid the Irish Republican Army (IRA).
Specifically, the terms included prohibitions on participating in any
IRA activities, belonging to any Irish or Irish Catholic organizations,
35. C. PORTER, R. WAIFE & H. HOLTROP, supra note 33, at 80-81.
36. Note that barrier methods of birth control have lower effectiveness rates than either
the pill or the IUD and are generally recommended when "intercourse is infrequent." Id. at
132.
37. The diaphragm, for example, "is relatively cumbersome and messy to use. As it
necessitates far more manipulation of the genitals that any other barrier methods, it may be
unacceptable for some people." Id. at 136. The contraceptive sponge involves the insertion
of chemicals and a foreign body into the vagina. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 32, at
3. Spermicides, including foams and jellies, also involve an obvious intrusion.
38. M. PoTrs & P. DIGGERY, CONTRACEPTIVE PRACnCE 100 (2d ed. 1983).
39. See M. SAIDI & C. ZAINIE, FEMALE STERILIZATION (1980).
40. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) "While it must be
recognized that probationers, like parolees and prisoners, properly are subject to limitations
from which ordinary persons are free, it is also true that these limitations in the aggregate
must serve the ends of probation." Id. at 265.
42. Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1974).
1989] 77
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and visiting any Irish pubs.43 But unlike the instant case, the
probations in Malone are "not too vague and [are] reasonably
related to the goals of probation and the accomplishment of public
order and safety."'
E. Arizona Constitutional Right of Privacy
The Arizona Constitution is much more explicit in its protection
of the right of privacy than is the United States Constitution.45
Specifically, there is a provision in the Arizona Constitution which
provides that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or
his home invaded, without authority of law."' In general, "[tjhe right
of privacy is deemed fundamental because it is basic to the concept
of the individual in our American culture, and because it is a
necessary prerequisite to the effective enjoyment of all our other
fundamental rights."4W Furthermore, the Arizona Supreme Court has
ruled that terms of probation may not violate basic fundamental
rights.'
43. Id. at 555.
44. Id. at 557.
45. Aiuz. CONST. art. II, § 8. In addition, when questions of privacy arise under the federal
Constitution, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding upon the courts of
Arizona. State v. Davis, 58 Ariz. 444, 120 P.2d 808 (1942).
46. Id.
47. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 271, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (Ct. App. 1975), vacated
sub nor., State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864
(1976). Also, the Arizona Supreme Court has declared that "[tihe right to sexual privacy
'exists within the context of the intimate sexual relations between consenting adults in
private,"' State v. B Bar Enter., Inc., 133 Ariz. 99, 101, 649 P.2d 978, 980 (1982) (quoting
State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110, 547 P.2d 6, 9 (1976)) and that "[t]he right to bodily
privacy is constitutionally protected .... Creamer v. Raffety, 145 Ariz. 34, 45, 699 P.2d 908,
919 (Ct. App. 1984).
48. State v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 566 P.2d 1329 (1977); see also State v. Livingston,
53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 196, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ct. App. 1976) ("the trial court is not
free to impose arbitrary conditions that significantly burden the defendant in the exercise of
her liberty and bearing only a remote relationship to the crime for which she was convicted
and to the objectives sought by probation of education and rehabilitation." Id.) In Porth v.
Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971), a condition of probation prohibiting the defendant
from speaking about the constitutionality of federal income tax laws was held to be invalid
as an infringement on freedom of speech. Id. On the other hand, the court in Porth did
uphold a condition of probation which prohibited the defendant from encouraging others
from violating laws, a type of speech that is arguably not within the protection of the first
amendment. Id.
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Also, under Arizona law, there exists a robust "fundamental right
to raise [one's own] child."49 Furthermore, "[t]he right to custody and
control of one's children has long been recognized as a fundamental
one" in Arizona."
IM FRE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
The first amendment of the United States Constitution provides
for the "free exercise" of religion.5  As the Supreme Court has
noted, "[tihis Court has long held the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment to be an absolute prohibition against governmental
regulation of religious beliefs .... [M]oreover, the Free Exercise
Clause provides substantial protection for lawful conduct grounded
in religious belief."52
There have been no cases dealing with the free exercise clause
and court-ordered birth control. Nevertheless, the free exercise
doctrine, as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, is
applicable to the instant issue. In Sherbert v. Verner," for example,
Adell Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was fired by her employer
for refusing to work on Saturdays, and the state declined to award
her unemployment compensation.54 The Supreme Court held that
the state action was an unconstitutional infringement on Sherbert's
freedom of religion.55 The Court noted that by declining benefits,
the state was essentially forcing Sherbert "to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in
order to accept work on the other hand."56
In addition, "[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important
49. Webb v. Charles, 125 Ariz. 558, 611 P.2d 562 (Ct. App. 1980).
50. In re Appeal in Pima County v. Howard, 112 Ariz. 170, 540 P.2d 642, 643 (1975); see
also In re Appeal in Cochise County, 133 Ariz. 157, 161, 650 P.2d 459, 462 (1982) ('Arizona
recognizes that the right to control and custody of one's children is fundamental" Id.); In re
Appeal in Gila County, 130 Ariz. 530, 534, 637 P.2d 740, 744 (1981) ("There can be no doubt
that the right to custody and control of one's children is a fundamental one." Id.)
51. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
52. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983). The free exercise clause
is also applicable to the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
53. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
54. Id. at 401.
55. Id. at 404.
56. Id.
1989]
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benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious
belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists."57  For example, the government cannot require school
children to salute the United States flag if they have religious
objections to doing so.5"
A. Courts' Power to Order Probationers
to Violate their Religion
Just as "a condition of probation which requires the probationer
to adopt religion or to adopt any particular religion would be
unconstitutional,"59 it would likewise be unconstitutional for a court
to require a probationer to engage in activity which violates the
tenets of her religion. For example, in Jones v. Commonwealth, a
state trial court had ordered two convicted juvenile defendants to
"attend Sunday School and Church each Sunday" as a condition of
probation.' The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed,
stating that this condition of probation was unconstitutional.61
Similarly, a Louisiana court held a condition of probation requiring
church attendence unconstitutional.62 Therefore, if the use of
contraception violates a probationer's religion then a court ordering
such probationer to use birth control is essentially ordering him or
her to violate the tenets of their religion.
B. Religious Basis for Beliefs
It is true that "[o]nly beliefs that are rooted in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives
special protection to the exercise of religion."' As we have men-
57. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
58. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Arizona courts have
a long history of interpreting the free exercise clause to give Arizona citizens full protection
from governmental intrusion. See, e.&, State v. Davis, 58 Ariz. 444, 120 P.2d 808 (1942).
59. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 1982).
60. Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. App. 1946).
61. Id.
62. State v. Morgan, 459 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
63. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
[Vol. V9I
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tioned, Debra Forster is Catholic. Since the Catholic Church's
prohibition on birth control is based on religious grounds,' and not
on mere philosophical or personal grounds which would not have
protection under the first amendment,65 the constitutionality of
court-ordered birth control is quite dubious. In fact, the Catholic
Church's prohibition on birth control was recently reaffirmed in
strong language.
C. Burden on Probationer to Assert
Free Exercise Infringement
Just as "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretations,"'
a court may similarly not delve into questions concerning the scope
of a person's religious beliefs 7.6  "Courts should not undertake to
dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is
'struggling' with the position or because his beliefs are not articu-
lated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person
might employ."'
It is true that Debra Forster had not articulated her religious
beliefs with much clarity and precision. However, "[m]en may believe
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their
religious doctrines or beliefs."'69 To obtain first amendment protec-
tion, a person need only demonstrate that he or she is a member of
a legitimate religious organization and that the tenets of the
organization are in conflict with some governmental action.'
64. Indeed, the Catholic Church's prohibition on birth control has been reaffirmed in
strong language. POPE PAUL VI, OF HUMAN LIFE (HUMANAE VrrAE) (1968).
65. Indeed, just as the Amishs' belief not to have their children attend public school beyond
the eighth grade was a matter of "deep religious conviction," based on a "literal interpretation
of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this
world ....', Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 206, 216 (1972) (quoting Romans 12:2), so is the
Catholic Church's ban on birth control biblically based. See POPE PAUL VI, supra note 64.
66. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
67. Id. at 715.
68. Id.
69. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
70. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 206, 234 (1972): "Aided by a history of three
centuries as an identifiable religious sect .. . the Amish in this case have convincingly
demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, . . .and the hazard's presented by the
State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others." Id. Compare with Thomas,
450 U.S. at 718.
The mere fact that the petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a governmen-
tal program does not mean that an exemption accommodating his practice must
1989]
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D. Court-Ordered Birth Control for a Catholic Probationer
Debra Forster is married and is a baptized Catholic. While
court-ordered birth control would not violate the religious freedoms
of many non-Catholics, it certainly infringes on the religious beliefs
of a Catholic probationer. The only methods of contraception that
are sanctioned by the Catholic Church are abstinence and "natural"
methods. 1
Sexual abstinence is not a "method" at all.' Furthermore, it is
unthinkable that a court could possibly have the power to order a
married woman to abstain from having sexual intercourse with her
husband; such an order would certainly infringe on Ms. Forster's
privacy in addition to her religious freedom.' Natural methods of
contraception, including fertility awareness techniques and the
withdrawal method are ineffective.74 For example, "[almong 100
women limiting intercourse by [fertility awareness] methods, about
24 may become pregnant over a year of actual use."'
Logically, the underlying purpose of an order like Term #20 is
for the probationer not to become pregnant.76 Since only the most
effective means of preventing pregnancy are "unnatural" methods
that are forbidden by the Catholic Church,' the only way that a
probationer like Ms. Forster could comply with the purpose of such
be granted. The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that
it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.
Id.
71. See, Pope Paul VI, supra note 64.
72. Even if abstinence is not a birth control "method," practising sexual abstinence would
probably constitute compliance with court-ordered birth control. Of course, there are also
sexual behaviors which are associated with little or no risk of pregnancy. Some of these
behaviors, such as anal intercourse, though, may be illegal and may also run afoul of religious
dogma. See, e.g., ARI_. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (1987)
73. The Catholic Church considers that conjugal relations between husband and wife have
important meaning with respect to marital harmony and fidelity. See POPE PAUL VI, supra
note 64, at 4.
74. M. Po'rrs & P. DIGGERY, supra note 38, at 78, 99.
75. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 32, at 2.
76. State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sept. 2, 1988). Certainly, if
it were claimed that the underlying purpose of Term #20 is merely that Debra Forster use
birth control, this is not a compelling state interest that can justify the infringement on her
constitutional rights. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
77. POPE PAUL VI, supra note 64.
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conditions of probation would be to disobey the tenets of her
Church by using an effective, unnatural method of birth control.7'
Debra Forster was forced to choose between following the
precepts of her religion by not practicing birth control and thus
violating her probation, or, abandoning this basic precept of her
religion in order to comply with probation.
III. STATE'S COMPELIING bfmRisrs vs. FuNiiDAMETAL RIGHTS
The fact that court-imposed birth control intrudes on rights of
privacy and religion does not end the inquiry. According to
constitutional doctrine, a balancing test is to be used. That is, an
intrusion into privacy or religious freedom can be justified by a
compelling state interest. Since the precise nature of balancing state
interests within the contexts are similar, we discuss them both in the
following sections.
A. Privacy Rights
In Roe v. Wade,' the Supreme Court laid down a balancing test
to be used when fundamental rights are infringed. Specifically, any
governmental action limiting fundamental rights may be justified only
by a "compelling state interest. '
In Forster, the only possible state interest in requiring Debra
Forster to use birth control would be to protect potential children
from child abuse.
However, in Rodriguez v. State,"1 where the defendant was
convicted of aggravated child abuse and, as conditions of probation,
ordered not to marry or get pregnant, the court struck down the
order, significantly noting that the conditions "add nothing to
decrease the possibility of further child abuse or other criminality."'
In Smith v. Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme Court implied that
78. Not only does Term #20 infringe on Debra Forster's current religious freedoms, but
because the probation is of lifetime duration, the Term also infringes on her future freedoms.
Even if Ms. Forster were not an extremely devout Catholic now, Term #20 would effectively
prevent her from ever fully complying with the doctrines of her Church.
79. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
80. Id. at 155.
81. Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
82. Id. at 10.
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the state does not have a legitimate interest in future children.'
The Smith court struck down court-ordered sterilization noting that
"[tihe sterilization ordered herein was to protect future children
from abuse, and not society from defective children."' Indeed, while
the state may act to protect the well-being of already existing
children who reside in the state,' the state has no legitimate interest
in children who do not, and may never, exist.'
B. Free Exercise Rights
Similarly, any burden on free exercise must be reviewed under
a test which balances the burden on religion against the state's
interest." In Wisconsin v. Yoder, ' for example, it was held to be an
unconstitutional infringement on the freedom of religion for the
state to require that children of Amish parents attend public school
beyond the eighth grade.' The Court acknowledged the state's
power and responsibility regarding education, but held that the
state's interest "is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those
specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. . . ."* Infringements on religious freedom "must be
justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest.""1
Indeed, "only those interests of the highest order ...can over-
balance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."'  Arizona
courts have also applied this rigorous standard, requiring the
existence of a "compelling state interest" to justify an infringement
83. Smith v. Supreme Court, 151 Ariz. 67, 725 P.2d 1101 (1986).
84. Id. at 69, 725 P.2d at 1103.
85. In re Appeal in Maricopa County, 120 Ariz. 82, 84, 584 P.2d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 1978).
86. See, e.g., People v. Hazelwonder, 138 11. App. 3d 213, 485 N.E. 2d 1211 (App. Ct.
1985). The court approved a condition of probation which restricted the rights of the
defendant to visit his minor child. The interest of the state was in protecting an existing child.
87. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK, & . YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUMONAL LAW § 21.6
(1986).
88. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
89. Id. at 234.
90. Id. at 214.
91. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
92. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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on the free exercise of religion.93
In Forster, the impact on Debra Forster's freedom of religion
was profound in its implications and of lifetime duration. Again,
while the state generally has strong interests involving the well-being
of existing children, the only possible interest of the state here is
some amorphous, abstract concern for children who may never come
into existence. Thus, the government had no compelling interest that
could justify the infringement on Mrs. Forster's religious freedom.
C. Least Restrictive Means
Even if there is a compelling state interest, any government
action that infringes on a fundamental right must be "narrowly
drawn."" Indeed, a government interest "cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved."'
Within the context of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme
Court has held "[t]he mere fact that the petitioner's religious
practice is burdened by a governmental program does not mean that
an exemption accomodating his practice must be granted. The state
may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interst.96
Even if the state has an interest in protecting a probationer's
unborn children, the mandate of compulsory birth control is not the
least restrictive means available to satisfy that interest. A less
restrictive means of protecting probationer's future children would
be future foster placement, termination of parental rights and/or
adoption proceedings. In the Forster case, especially because Debra
was still very young, counseling services or parenting skills classes
93. In re Marriage of Gove, 117 Ariz. App. 324, 329, 572 P.2d 458 (Ct. App. 1977). See
also State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 29, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ct. App. 1973). "It is
well settled that the First Amendment right to freedom of religion grants an individual the
right to the free exercise of his chosen religion without governmental intervention or
interference unless a 'compelling state interest'.., is proven." Id.
94. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 178 (1973).
95. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). For example, in People v. Pointer, 151
Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1141, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1984), the court concluded that
"the condition of probation prohibiting conception is overbroad, as less restrictive alternatives
are available that would feasibly provide the protections that trial court believed necessary."
Il
96. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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could enable her to be a suitable parent in the future. None of
these less restrictive alternatives would infringe upon Debra's
religious freedoms.
IV. CRUEL AND UNusuAL PuNIsHMEr
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution
provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."' The
cruel and unusual clause of the Constitution is applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment." Furthermore, the
wording of Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution is
identical to the eighth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.'
The eighth amendment draws its meaning from "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. " "
While the state may punish its citizens, it must treat those it
punishes with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings."1
Court-ordered birth control as a condition of probation may violate
the cruel and unusual clause of both the United States and Arizona
Constitutions. A dangerous precedent would be set if the govern-
ment were allowed to require a defendant to use birth control as a
condition of probation. This "[c]ruelty might become an instrument
of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either honest or sinister.""
A. The Resultant Stigmatization and
Alientation of Court-Ordered Birth Control
If a punishment offends fundamental notions of human dignity,
it may be classified as cruel and unusual even when its primary or
only effect is psychological. 3 Sentences that seek to cast out a
defendant from society have universally been found to be cruel and
97. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
98. Louisiana e reL Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 460 (1947).
99. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 15.
100. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1957).
101. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) (1971).
102. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
103. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
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unusual."
Term #20 could thus be considered cruel and unusual because
it would subject Debra Forster to undue stigmatization and aliena-
tion. The probation condition of enforced barrenness would result
in social isolation for Debra Forster; such forced condition would
stigmatize her in the eyes of the community."
In The Scarlett Letter, Nathaniel Hawthorne explored the cruel
and stigmatizing effects of forcing a woman to wear a scarlet "A"
stitched to her clothing.'" Particularly because of the intense local
and national publicity, and because the entire nation has been told
of the conditions of her probation, Term #20 would have a similar
effect on Debra Forster. Indeed, forced contraception or involun-
tary sterilization has been called "a brand of infamy,"' °7 that will
subject the probationer to "shame and humiliation and degradation
and mental torture."'0
B. Associated Health Risks of Forced Birth Control
Every method of birth control is associated with the risk of pain
and a danger to health."° For a court to require a probationer to
involuntarily subject herself to these risks is cruel and unusual."'
The most effective birth control methods, the birth control pill"'
104. Furman, 408 U.S. at 273. Accord Trop, 356 U.S. at 86 (Supreme Court held that
denationalization for the crime of wartime desertion was cruel and unusual, even though the
punishment did not involve any physical mistreatment, because denationalization causes the
individual to be alienated from organized society. Id. at 101).
105. See Note, Stiking the Balance Between Privacy and Supervision: The Fourth Amendment
and Parole and Probation Officer Searches of Parolees and Probationers, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV.
800, 816 (1976) ("'he demeaning effect of arbitrary intrusions into the parolee's privacy will
be reflected in the attitudes of his relatives and friends." Id.).
106. N..HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETrER (1859).
107. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918).
108. Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413, 417 (S.D. Iowa 1914).
109. See generally LONG-TERM STUDIES ON SIDE-EFFECTS OF CONTRACEPTION (A. Lindberg
& P. Reichertz eds. 1978)
110. See Gunter v. State, 153 Ariz. 386, 388, 736 P.2d 1198, 1199 (Ct. App. 1987)
("Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs may constitute the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain that the eighth amendment proscribes." Id.)
111. Oral contracptives can cause nausea, vomiting, bleeding, urinary tract infection, vaginal
discharge, chloasma, headache, depressions, mastalgia, weight fluctuations, and circulatory
problems. C. PORTER, R. WAIFE & H. HoLTRoP, supra note 33, at 49-67. More seriously,
there is some evidence showing a relationship betwen pill usage and stroke, hemorrhage,
hypertension, gallstones, and heart attack. Id. Indeed, the use of oral contraceptives can aptly
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and the intrauterine device (IUD),"' involve severe physical
intrusions. Cases on toxic shock syndrome,"' as well as bladder
infection,"4 have been reported among diaphragm users, and
condoms and vaginal spermicides may cause vaginal irritation."5
Finally, the risks associated with surgical sterilization as a method of
birth control are profound."6
C. Equal Protection
"The basic rule of equal protection in criminal cases is that no
person should be subject to a greater or different punishment than
another in similar circumstances.""' 7 The only readily available birth
control device for men is a condom, which does not involve
significant bodily intrusion."' Female birth control methods, on the
other hand, are more dangerous and are necessarily more intrusive
in that they require an ingestion of chemicals or the insertion of a
foreign device into the vagina. If a male defendant were convicted
of child abuse and were ordered to use birth control for the rest of
his life as a condition of probation, the invasion on his privacy
would not be as great, the health dangers associated with birth
control use would not be as severe, and the punishment would not
be so cruel and unusual. Thus, court-ordered birth control for
women raises issues of equal protection, both independently and in
conjunction with the eighth amendment.
be characterized as "dangerous." See P. BOFFA, PATHOLOCICAL EFFECIS OF ORAL
CONTRACEPTIVES (1973); Masterson, Oral Contraceptive Agents: Current Status, 155 Am. J.
SURGERY 619 (1988).
112. Dangers associated with the IUD include uterine perforation, ectopic pregnancy, and
pelvic inflammatory disease. D. EDELMAN, G. BERGER & L. KErnH, supra note 34, at 34, 55.
Note also that the severe health dangers associated with the IUD have been the subject of
much tort litigation. E.g., Lindsey v. A. H. Robbins Co., 715 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1983).
113. M. POTTS & P. DIGGERY, supra note 38, at 133.
114. PLANNED PARENTHOOD, supra note 32, at 3.
115. C. PORTER, R. WAIFE, & H. HOLTROP, supra note 33, at 146, 150. "Two preliminary
studies have found an increased incidence of congenital abnormalities in the offspring of
women who used vaginal spermicides near the time of conception." Id. at 153-54.
116. See generally M. SAIDI & C. ZAINIE, supra note 39.
117. State v. Steelman, 120 Ariz. 301, 585 P.2d 1213 (1978).




D. The Implication of Thompson vs. Oklahoma
Debra Forster was barely seventeen years old when she
committed the acts for which she was eventually convicted and put
on probation.119 In Arizona, a seventeen year old child is considered
a minor for most purposes.' In Thompson v. Oklahoma,"' the
Supreme Court held that although the death penalty is not per se
unconstitutional, the eighth amendment prohibits the execution of
a person who was a minor at the time of the offense." Even if
forced birth control were constitutional, it is certainly unconstitution-
al when applied to a defendant who was a minor at the time the
offense was committed.
V. INvoLuNTARY STERILIA ON
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court declared that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundemental to the very existance
and survival of the race." "l In fact, parents have a "fundamental
liberty interest" in the care, custody and management of their
child.124  Term #20 would have denied Debra Forster these
fundamental constitutional rights.
Specifically, because the intent of a condition like Term #20 is
to prohibit the female probationer from ever becoming pregnant,
this essentially has the same effect as, court-ordered involuntary
sterilization." In complying with Term #20, Mrs. Forster would not
have been permitted to procreate or to care for future children and
thus, she would have been denied fundamental constitutional
rights."6
119. See Sentencing Memorandum, at 5, State v. Forster., No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co.,
Ariz., June 7, 1988).
120. For example, a seventeen year older may not serve on a jury. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-301(D) (Supp. 1987).
121. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
122. Id.
123. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
124. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
125. Sterilization is "a procedure by which a human ... is made incapable of reproduction."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2238 (3d ed. 1976). The court mandating
Term #20 constitutes such a "procedure."
126. See also supra pp. 2-8, for further discussion on why court-ordered birth control
infringes on the constitutional right of privacy.
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A. Legal Court-Ordered Sterilization
Although some jurisdictions have permitted court-ordered
sterilization for incompetents, sterilization has been found to be
unconstitutional if it is coercive or not in the best interests of the
person being sterilized.127 "[B]efore sanctioning the sterilization of
an incompetent, the court must take great care to ensure that the
incompetent's rights are zealously guarded.""z  Court-ordered
sterilization is permitted only after the strictest possible judicial
review to ensure that the procedure is in the best interests of the
person involved. Sterilization is constitutionally impermissable as
punishment or as a term of probation.
B. Involuntary Sterilization as Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The method by which a punishment is carried out is subject to
judicial scrutiny under the cruel and unusual clause. 29 Because
involuntary sterilization is associated with devastating psychological
effects, its punitive use constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
"[T]he power to sterilize, if excercised, may have subtle, far-reaching
and devastating effects."'"
In Davis v. Berry, the court struck down a statute that allowed
sterilization of a prisoner who had suffered two felony convictions. 3'
The court emphasized the mental cruelty associated with forced
sterilization, stating that:
The physical suffering may not be so great, but that is not
the only test of cruel punishment; the humiliation, the
degradation the mental suffering are always present and
known by all the public, and will follow him wheresoever he
may go. This belongs to the Dark Ages.'
127. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 368 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
128. In re C.D.M., K.C.M., & B.L.M. v. State, 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska 1981).
129. McKellar v. Ariz. State Dep't of Corrections, 115 Ariz. 591, 593, 566 P.2d 1337, 1339
(1977).
130. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).




Federal courts have emphasized that involuntary sterilization is
an impermissible mutilation, not only because of the physical
intrusion, but mainly because of the loss of procreative power.3 a
In Mickle v. Henrichs, for example, the court noted that even in
1916, the vasectomy operation could be performed under local
anesthetic in only a few minutes and with no physical discomfort or
impairment of sexual ability." Nevertheless, the court concluded
that "[v]asectomy in itself is not cruel ... but, when resorted to as
punishment, it is ignominious and degrading, and in that sense is
cruel."'35  Similarly, the court in Davis, compared a court-ordered
vasectomy with court-ordered castration and noted that although
castration is more severe, the vasectomy "in its results is much the
coarser and more vulgar," because of the loss of power to pro-
create.136
The Arizona Attorney General, in considering the constitution-
ality of a bill prescribing the penalty of castration for the commis-
sion of rape upon a child victim, ruled that such a law would be
unconstitutional as a violation of the cruel and unusual clauses of
the United States and Arizona Constitutions.137 The Attorney
General stressed the mental cruelty associated with punitive
sterilization and concluded that:
We are in complete sympathy with the proponents for
legislative action of a positive type to prevent repetition by
rapists covered in the proposed bill. However, in compliance
with a request for a legal opinion as to the constitutionality
of a proposed bill, we must remove personal feelings, as well
as emotions, and supplant them with both sober and con-
sidered legal conclusions. Therefore, it must be our opinion
in this instance, based on the legal authority contained
therein, that the proposed bill is unconstitutional."
Similarly, involuntary sterilization of Debra Forster through court-
imposed birth control would have been unconstitutional.
133. Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 691 (D. Nev. 1918).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 690.
136. Davis, 216 F. at 416.
137. Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. 56-13, at 29 (1956).
138. Id. at 29.
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Considering, then, that involuntary sterilization has been held
to be unconstitutional even for very serious crimes such as rape,139
the infliction of involuntary sterilization is disproportionate to the
crime of attempted child abuse, and is thus cruel and unusual."4
Furthermore, a punishment may be found to be disproportionate to
the offense "whether imposed without or within prison walls."''
And even if a sentence or condition of probation is authorized by
statute, the penalty may still be cruel and unusual.4
As involuntary sterilization, Debra Forster's proposed punishment
is certainly "cruel," it is also undoubtedly "unusual." The Supreme
Court struck down a Georgia death penalty for the crime of rape,
noting that Georgia was the only state authorizing the death penalty
for rapists of adult women. t 3  Concerning the instant case, we are
unaware of any other court in the United States that has upheld
involuntary sterilization as a condition of probation."M In fact, as we
have discussed, even where serious offenses are involved, courts
have rejected punishments that impinge on reproductive freedom
even in cases involving the most heinous of crimes.'45
C. Jurisdiction to Impose Sterilization in Arizona
The recent case of Smith v. Superior Court,"4 is directly relevant
to the instant matter. In Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court held
that a Superior Court Judge did not have jurisdiction to require that
139. Id.
140. Both the United States Supreme Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367
(1910) and the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Espinosa, 101 Ariz. 474, 421 P.2d 322
(1966) (quoting State v. Taylor, 82 Ariz. 289, 294, 312 P.2d 162, 166 (1957)) have held that
a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual if it is disproportionate to the offense
for which it is imposed.
141. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
142. See State v. Day, 148 Ariz. 490, 715 P.2d 743 (1986); State v. Mulalley, 127 Ariz. 92,
618 P.2d 586 (1980).
143. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
144. A test for determining whether a punishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual
includes an examination of the offense, the harshness of the penalty, the sentences imposed
in the same jurisdiction, and the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions. State v. Williams,
144 Ariz. 433, 445, 698 P.2d 678, 690 (1985); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1983).
145. Mickle v. Henricks, 262 F. 687, 688 (D. Nev. 1918). See, e.&, State v. Brown, 284
S.C. 407, 409, 326 S.E.2d 410, 412 (1985) (surgical castration overturned for defendants
convicted of a brutal sexual assault). These reflect the tendency of courts to "restrain cruel
innovations in the way of punishment" even when confronted with irredeemable defendants.
146. Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Ariz. 67, 725 P.2d 1101 (1986).
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the defendants be sterilized as a condition of reduced sentence.147
Similarly, an Arizona Superior Court Judge does not have jurisdic-




There is a general legal principle that statutes and regulations
must be sufficiently clear and definate so as to provide fair notice
and warning.14 To punish someone for violating a vague statute by
depriving them of liberty or property, amounts to a constitutional
due process infringement. 9
Indeed, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
requires that the law give sufficient warning so that people can
conform their conduct to its dictates.5 ' Specifically, in order to be
constitutional, a statute must give a "person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden . ..
Although most of the constitutional decisions dealing with vagueness
concern criminal statutes, the same principle applies to a vague
conditon of probation.
Certainly, one's liberty interests are at stake when violating either
a criminal statute or a condition of probation, and "[n]o one may be
required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes."'5 The problem of vagueness is par-
ticularly acute in situations like the instant case where the uncertain-
ty "threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights."153 As the United States Supreme Court has stated:
It is a basic pinciple of due process that an enactment is void
for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined ....
[Blecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
147. Id.
148. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
149. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
150. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975).
151. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
152. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
153. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391 (1979).
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and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.'54
Arizona courts follow these same principles.'55 In State v. Belny,
the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
[I]n order for a penal statute to be constitutional it must be
sufficiently definite and certain to inform members of society
what they may, and what they may not, legally do. If the
statute is found to be indefinite and uncertain then it is in
conflict with the "due process" clauses of both our Federal and
State Constitutions and must be declared void.'56
B. Vagueness of Debra Forster's Condition of Probation
According to term #20 of Debra Forster's probation order, she
was to "remain on some method of birth control" for life.
157
Furthermore, Forster was required to periodically supply "written
evidence" of her birth control use to her probation officer.'58 If
Forster were deemed to be in violation of probation, she would
have been in grave danger of having her liberty taken away.
Problems arise because the precise form of birth control to be
used is undefined and the nature of the documentation is left
unspecified.'59 Indeed, there is no question that Forster was forced
154. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
155. State v. Tocco, 156 Ariz. 116, 750 P.2d 874 (1988). "'he basic rule in reviewing a
statute for vagueness is to determine whether the offense is defined in terms that people of
average intelligence can understand, since no one may be required at the risk of his liberty
to speculate as to the meaning of a penal statute." State v. Serrano, 145 Ariz. 498, 500, 702
P.2d 1343, 1345 (Ct. App. 1985).
156. State v. Berry, 101 Ariz. 310, 312, 419 P.2d 337, 339 (1966).
157. Sentence of Probation, at 28, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz.,
May 24, 1988).
158. Id.
159. Also, in issuing Term #20, Judge Ellis-Budzyn may not have been fully cognizant of
the various informational barriers, Algier, Informational Barriers to Contraception, in ADOLE-
scENTs, SEx, AND COrRACEPTION 143 (D. Byrne & W. Fisher eds. 1983), and emotional
barriers to contraception use that have been identified by social scientiests. Fisher, Byrne &




to "speculate as to the meaning" of her probation." Term #20 did
not specify that Debra Forster must use an effective means of birth
control. That raises the question of whether Forster could have
satisfied her probation by proving that she adheres to an ineffective
method of birth control such as withdrawal? Or would Debra
Forster have been in compliance with the probation condition only
if she does not get pregnant?
Also, because no method of birth control is 100% effective,
Debra Forster could have used a theoretically effective method of
birth control, gotten pregnant, and presumably been in violation of
probation.' In addition, some methods of birth control are in the
control of the male partner."' Would Debra Forster have been in
compliance with probation if her husband used a condom, or even
the withdrawal method, but the method fails?
Because the consequences of violating probation are so severe
and are of lifetime duration, probationers like Debra Forster must
also consider future possibilities. For example, must she use some
method of birth control even if she is later unable to bear children
because of disease, illness, or menopause?
Even if Debra Forster used relatively effective methods of birth
control, she would have been unable to "prove" her compliance with
the order, especially if she became pregnant. No amount of written
"documentation" could distinguish a condom that failed from an
improperly used condom or from a condom left sitting in a drawer.
No documentation can prove that the rhythm method was really
used, that purchased oral contraceptives were actually swallowed, or
that the man actually attempted to withdraw his penis prior to
ejaculation.
C. Abortion as Birth Control
Since Debra Forster's probation did not specify the method of
birth control and since abortion is a means of controlling birth,
Forster could have obtained an abortion to comply with the terms
160. State v. Serrano, 145 Ariz. at 500, 702 P.2d at 1345 (1985).
161. Oral contraceptives are ineffective among women who have difficulty remembering to
take the pill every day. C. PORTER, R. WAIFE & H. HOLTROP, supra note 33, at 30. The
IUD has an estimated failure rate of 3%. Id. at 77. Condoms, and other barrier methods,
can also be ineffective, especially if used improperly. Id. at 145-49.
162. See generally, G. ZATUCHNI, supra note 118.
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of her probation.1" Indeed, because of the ready availability of
abortion in the United States since Roe v. Wade, many women,
particularly those who have had multiple abortions, consider
abortion to be a form of birth control.'" "There is a strongly held
view that abortion is performed too readily in this country and that
some women are using it as a substitute for contraception."' 6
In order to risk being held in violation of probation, Debra
Forster may choose to have an abortion, even if she wanted to bear
the child. Such a situation, amounting to court-ordered abortion,
would unconstitutionally infringe on Debra Forster's privacy and
religious fredoms, would subject her to profound health risks making
the punishment cruel and unusual, and would establish a frightening
legal precedent.1"
163. Although the terms "birth control" and "contraception" are often used interchangably,
there may be an important distinction. While abortion may be excluded from the category
of "contraception" in that it literally does not prevent conception, abortion is certainly a
method of "birth control" in that it prevents a birth from happening. Term #20 of Debra
Forster's probation order mandates some method of "birth control." State v. Forster, No. CR-
87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sup. Ct., Sept. 2, 1988). In contrast, the probation order in
People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1133, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (Ct. App. 1984)
required the defendant "not conceive" during the probationary period. In Rodriguez v. State,
378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the probationer was ordered not to become pregnant,
while in State v. Livingston, 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ct. App. 1976),
the order was that the probationer "not have another child." Note that the conditions of
probation were struck down in all three of these cases even though they were not as vague
as Term #20.
164. In fact, commentators have noted that "[tlhe relation between contraceptive practice
and abortion has been clouded for social as well as academic reasons .... [but] [i]n a very
real sense, both contraception and abortion are essential for controlling fertility and meeting
the goals demanded of modern living." M. Porrs & P. DIGGERY, supra note 38, at 315, 318.
165. I. ALLEN, FAMILY PLANNING STERILIZATION AND ABORTION SERVICES 66 (1981). In
fact, considering that it is fairly common for some women to have repeat abortions, it has
been noted that "the abortion procedure has, in effect, become a method of birth control,
slowing the population growth by about a quarter." Allgier, supra note 159, at 183. (citation
omitted). Furthermore, the majority of the young women sampled in a large-scale survey
agreed that "abortions are so easy to get these days that I don't really worry about getting
pregnant." R. SORENSON, ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1973).
166. In People v. Pointer, 151 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Ct. App. 1984),
where the trial judge ordered the defendant not to conceive, the appellate court struck down
the condition noting that, in the event the defendant became pregnant during the period of
probation the surreptitious procuring of an abortion might be the only practical way to avoid
going to prison. A condition of probation that might place a defendant in this position, and,
if so, be coercive of abortion, is in our view improper. Id. at 1140-41, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
BIRTH CONTROL
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, there can be no serious dispute that court-ordered
birth control as a condition of probation is unconstitutional. First,
it constitutes a severe intrusion into privacy by sharply restricting
intimate sexual, reproductive, and parental behavior. Short of court-
imposed surgical procedures, it is difficult to imagine a clearer
intrusion of constitutional privacy.
Second, for people whose religion prohibits the use of artificial
contraception, court-imposed birth control constitutes a free exercise
infringement. For Catholics, like Debra Forster, the prohibition
against contraception is so fundamental to their religion that such
a free exercise violation is particularly pronounced.
Third, for the government to intrude into people's privacy or to
restrict their religious freedom, the government must have a
compelling interest. Although the government may certainly have
an interest in ordering some of its citizens to use contraception, the
interest is far from "compelling." Furthermore, court-imposed birth
control is not the least restrictive means to achieve this interest.
Fourth, court-ordered birth control could be considered cruel
and unusual punishment, particularly in light of the stigmatization
and associated health risks. In this regard, because contraception is
inherently more hazardous for women, there is a plausible equal
protection argument.
Fifth, court-ordered birth control can be likened to impermis-
sible involuntary sterilization.
Finally, a court order to use contraception will necessarily be
either unconstitutionally vague, such as the situation in the Forster
case, or, be so specific as to 'further intrude into the person's
privacy. Additionally, an open-ended order mandating the use of
any type of birth control raises the very troubling notion that an
abortion might be obtained soley to comply with the court order.
VIII. EPILOGUE
After Judge Ellis-Budzyn ordered Debra Forster to use birth
control for life as a condition to probation, Mrs. Forster filed an
appeal with the Arizona Court of Appeals. On August 29, 1988,
counsel for Forster appeared before Judge Ellis-Budzyn to challenge
the terms of probation and announced in Court that Forster was in
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fact pregnant. The Arizona Civil Liberties Union appeared as
amicus curiae.167 On September 2, 1988, Judge Ellis-Budzyn issued
a memorandum rescinding the offending term." In its place, Judge
Ellis-Budzyn imposed new terms to protect the fetus, ordering
Debra Forster to submit to urinalysis testing for drugs and enroll in
parenting and prenatal care classes." In addition, the national
media attention on Forster continued even after the legal issues
were resolved.17
The controversy over the constitutionality of court-imposed birth
control is intensifying. In Indiana, a judge recently proposed that
a woman who poisoned her child be sterilized in order to receive a
more lenient sentence. 7' Until appellate courts definitively rule that
such practices are unconstitutional, judicial excess will continue.
167. See Memorandum, at 1, State v. Forster, No. CR-87-10445 (Maricopa Co., Ariz., Sept.
2, 1988).
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 3-4.
170. Debra Forster was invited to appear on The Phil Donahue Show for an airing on
November 16, 1988. Judge Budzyn denied Forster permission to leave the state to appear
on the show, ruling that she was "too vulnerable" and that appearing on television "would be
like throwing her into the mouths of sharks." Judge Budzyn herself also declined an invitation
to appear on the show. Judge Says Probationer Mom Can't Appear on 'Donahue.' Ariz.
Republic, Oct. 26, 1988, at 3-2, col. 1.
171. Plan to Sterilize Woman is Debated, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, at § 1, at 35, col. 1
(also discussing the Forster case).
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